Strategic Assessment of the Sudanese Current Situation in view of Al-Burhan’s Foreign Visits

Introduction:

General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, chairman of the Sudanese ruling the Sovereignty Council, has recently conducted a number of foreign visits; Egypt was his first stop, followed respectively by South Sudan, Qatar and Eritrea, while Turkey was his last stop (at the time of writing this report). These visits along with the Sudanese choices of the countries and leaders with whom General Al-Burhan has met have not been a coincidence. Rather, they were part of Sudan’s clear vision for the external movements in the coming period, and certain expectations regarding effective roles that these countries can play, both in terms of stopping the war or adopting a political solution and restoring stability in Sudan. These visits have gained momentum due to regional and international anticipation, especially from the countries concerned and interested in the current crisis.

 Hence, Peace Center for Strategic Studies has found that these visits could be a focal point for a new phase that calls for “a Strategic Assessment of the Current Situation in Sudan” regarding its local, regional and international dimensions. The assessment also analyzes the military dimensions of the conflict, and evaluates the visits and their results during the next phase.

The assessment includes the following axes:

• General Context of Sudan’s Current Situation.
• Analysis of the Operational Status.
• Analysis of Al-Burhan Foreign Visits.
• Feeds and Future Visions.

General Context of Sudan’s Current Situation

Al-Burhan’s foreign visits have been arranged after political, strategic, and military governing determinants for the situation in the interior of Sudan, particularly since 15^th April and up to the present. These determinants are of local, regional, and international dimensions that are challenging to distinctly separate.

• Political Situation Inside Sudan:

The political scene inside Sudan remains confused, owing to the consequences of the war, where the civil political path was frozen, and the internal political movement formed after 25^th October 2022; demonstrations led by the Civil Movement and Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) against the military component (Transitional Sovereignty Council) were halted, in exchange for counter-demonstrations by the Sovereignty Council to assert its legitimacy in the face of internal and external pressure. The aforementioned movement has led to divisions between the army leadership and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) over the unification of the military establishment, as one of the demonstrators’ demands that also have included the return of power to civilians, the need for the army to return to its barracks and not to involve in political affairs.

Thus, all the previous circumstances resulted in a direct clash between the Sudanese military parties, creating a complete rift between them, especially on 15^th April. Local and regional parties tried to intervene to resolve the dispute and stop the war, most notably the initiative of university professors. In addition the Saudi Ambassador in Sudan held a number of meetings at the Saudi Embassy headquarters in Khartoum. Nevertheless, all of these steps have achieved no significant results.

As the war continued, political life in Sudan has been disrupted and the civilian movements of political forces have been halted. Metaphorically, the war has hijacked the political path inside Sudan, making political interactions have become concentrated between the army and the RSF, amid confusion and a clear divide between political groups over the support of either of the two fighting sides, which previously belonged to the so-called “The Military Component”.

It was clear that the visions and opinions of the Sudanese political forces were not correct, especially in the early weeks of the confrontations between the conflicting parties; some forces spoke of a manoeuvre of the military component, while others expected limited confrontations that would be controlled by internal or external interventions. However, what the political forces did not expect was that these clashes turned into a genuine war within Khartoum, in which all kind of weapons were used, and the war geographically expanded to other areas outside Khartoum, especially in Darfur. Over time, the humanitarian situation was exacerbated by war, and there were displaced or fleeing in huge numbers to the neighboring countries. In addition, citizens’ homes were destroyed, infrastructure was targeted, homes and property were stolen and looted by the RSF. Hospitals were decommissioned, there was a total absence of services, and public life in Khartoum was completely paralyzed. Some areas of the Capital were transformed into operational areas and others into areas free of population and life.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese political forces’ moves to stop the war were weak, as a result of their division and lack of agreement on a road map that could be accepted by the fighting parties, or even the international community. Their attitudes were mixed -if not fully stated- between a supporter and an opponent of the parties to the war. The (FFC) tended to support the RSF, where both speeches were similar, while other forces with relative weight such as (traditional parties – civil administrations) preferred to be neutral; focusing on (useless) demands and appeals to stop the war.

It can therefore be said that Sudanese political forces, in general, are still unable to keep pace with the rapid events in Sudan’s scene and have even failed to present a unified initiative or to adopt real steps that would change balances on the ground through providing political or material support to any of the fighting parties.

Some political forces such as the (FFC) made external moves, especially in the period prior to Al-Burhan’s foreign visits; including visits and meetings with officials in Egypt, Qatar and other countries, to come up with a vision of the nature of the current phase and possible solutions to it. However, concrete outputs for these meetings have yet to form, due to the internal contradictions between Sudanese civilian currents, including the (FFC); the political bloc that contributed to the overthrow of Al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, and also divided into two currents: Central Freedom and Change and Freedom and Change Charter. In addition, Sudanese traditional parties, such as Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party (Al-Ittihadi Al-Dimuqrati) with their different wings, had also reservations about any revolutionary approach used violent tools for political change. Civil attitudes on the Initiatives of a solution have varied, whether from the Egyptian-led Sudan Neighborhood Initiative, the Saudi-led Jeddah Initiative supported by the U.S.A., or the IGAD Initiative led by countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya.

• Regional Situations:

Since the earliest days of the war, it has been clear that the Sudanese crisis is no longer internal, due to the large numbers of displaced persons fleeing the war to neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Chad, noting that numbers are still increasing at the time of writing this report. It is important to shed light on the prominent roles played by Egypt and other regional countries in the evacuation of foreign missions and nationals from Sudan.

Lately, providing facilities for those fleeing war and the problems they face in receiving countries has become the talking point of any bilateral meetings between Sudanese officials and their counterparts in neighboring countries. Therefore, any future solutions to the crisis, especially when it comes to refugee return, reconstruction, and border control in cooperation with the Sudanese government, etc., should include neighboring countries that have received Sudanese on their territory and provided them with secure livelihoods.

Egypt’s role has been the most striking one; Cairo has affirmed its commitment to a number of key principles, including non-interference in Sudan’s internal affairs, firm support for Sudanese institutions, and advocacy for any option on which the Sudanese can settle.

Saudi Arabia was also one of the most prominent countries but from outside the neighboring countries that intervened to resolve the crisis in Sudan. Riyadh has made proposals to stop the war and declare a truce more than once, with support of the U.S., in order to facilitate humanitarian missions and pave the way for direct negotiations between the army and the RSF, under the umbrella of a negotiating platform known as the “Jeddah Platform”. However, the Platform’s outputs have not been applied or adhered to by the warring parties. Therefore, all the proposed ceasefire failed that some failed before hours of its implementation. More than once, Sudanese army has withdrawn from the platform because it was not convinced of its effectiveness.

Then, the IGAD countries tried to introduce an initiative for a solution, but they were strongly rejected by the Sudanese government (the Sovereignty Council), because they put forward ideas that were not acceptable to the Sudanese about military intervention as well as the imposition of a no-fly zone and sanctions, etc. This was considered by Sudan as an unjustified intervention by the regional organization that Sudan contributed to establishing.

Under the umbrella of the IGAD initiative, Sudan has reserved the Kenyan role, as Sudanese officials have spoken of a non-neutral role for the Kenyan president himself, while Sudanese media outlets have reported on ties between the Kenyan president and the RSF Commander Lieutenant General / Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in specific fields such as gold investment.

In light of Sudan’s rejection of the IGAD initiative, Egypt intensified its efforts to search for acceptable solutions; Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has led movements at the level of leaders, and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the concerned agencies have also taken action through direct meetings or contacts with some Sudanese parties, as well as with some countries concerned with the Sudanese issue.

Meanwhile, Cairo was the destination of many officials from the United States, Europe, and other countries to come up with realistic ideas and visions for a solution, with the goal of a ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian missions, and creating a road map for political solutions. The intensified Egyptian moves during that period have led to the idea of establishing a platform for Sudan’s neighboring countries, as they were directly concerned with the crisis and were most affected by its current and future consequences. Accordingly, a summit meeting of the leaders of Sudan’s neighboring countries was held in Cairo, and resulted in a clear statement of those countries’ vision of the Sudanese situation, the determinants of a solution, and the proposal of effective implementation mechanisms. These mechanisms included consultative meetings at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and a meeting in Chad had already held. A third meeting of this mechanism is expected to take place in the coming period, to prepare the ground for a leaders’ summit to elaborate possible solutions to the crisis.

For its part, the parties to the Sudanese crisis’s acceptance of the new Platform revealed confidence in it and its sponsors. The Sudanese parties realized that this platform is already able to handle the crisis realistically and responsibly, given that Egypt is the worst affected country, and it will be the most eager to put an end to the war.

• International Situation:

Over the past five months, the international community’s response to the crisis in Sudan has been focused on advocating for stopping the war, evacuating foreign nationals, ensuring diplomatic missions, and providing humanitarian support through the UN and affiliated sub- organizations, as well as international NGOs working in relief and those with previous experience in combat zones such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and others.

Sudan’s crisis has been discussed more than once at UN organs, especially the Security Council, but there has been no real and effective action to stop the war by putting pressure on the fighting parties. The international community also overlooked the daily condemnation of crimes committed by the RSF, some of which amounted to war crimes, in a complete absence of rules of international humanitarian law.

It was also clear during the period prior to General Al-Burhan’s foreign visits that the U.S. and European countries have focused on the Russian presence in Sudan, Russia’s relations with both the Sudanese military and the RSF. Much speculation was raised about a possible role for Russia’s Wagner group in Sudan, until the US Department of State came out with a clear statement denying any indications of a role for Wagner in the Sudanese fight.

The United States has adopted a hedging strategy towards the new variables in Sudan’s crisis, focusing on protecting its interests there, in anticipation of a scenario of possible chaos and security fragility that may extend to some neighboring countries, especially Chad, Central Africa, and others. Accordingly, the U.S. has increased its military readiness amid concerns that Russia will try to take advantage of the war in Sudan to bolster its security and military presence in this vital region, in conjunction with events in Niger and Gabon in West Africa.

In this regard, the military actions taken by the United States have included:

• Repositioning the U.S. troops deployed at some of its bases in the region, particularly in Niger.
• Reinforcing the U.S. naval presence in the Red Sea.
• Redeploying the U.S. Army Reserve Forces in the Sudanese neighborhood of Djibouti (Camp Lemonier), Somalia (Kismayo) and Kenya (Manda Bay).
• Redeploying the U.S. forces at Air Base 201 in Agadir in Niger and opening a sub-base for drones at the same base, as well as providing Base 101 in Niamey with Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Military Situation of the fighting parties:

A power struggle between the military component’s parties, particularly between the Chairman and the deputy chairman of the Council of Sovereignty, was not expected, bringing the conflict on the ground to a standstill. Various areas of the Sudan have witnessed ongoing and mutual hostilities, in the absence of military decisiveness from either side of the conflict to date. Meanwhile, external actors continue to provide support to the fighting parties, in particular the RSF, with military capabilities, including weapons, ammunition, equipment and even personnel, to prolong the war.

Following the overthrow of Bashir and his government, attention to the Sudanese army during the transitional phase waned in terms of providing with weapons, equipment and training. In contrast, the RSF received apparent attention from its commander Lieutenant General / Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo; they were supplied with the most modern weapons and equipment, and were trained in the best modern combat techniques. Therefore, they are highly trained forces that possess modern weapons compared to their previous state, and they have combat experience in cities, due to their previous participation in some conflicts in Darfur and other areas.

• The Operational Status of the RSF:

The RSF are stationed in Khartoum; prior to the outbreak of the war, they were tasked with guarding the most important strategic facilities in the Sudanese capital, such as the Republican Palace, the airport, some ministries, the radio and television building, etc. This may explain the rapid progress on the ground achieved by the RSF in the early days and weeks of the war. However, owing to military pressure by the Sudanese army, the RSF barricaded themselves in buildings in Khartoum, using “hit-and-run” strategy and guerrilla approach.

In addition, the RSF have also employed psychological warfare and propaganda methods by claiming to control vital areas in Khartoum, such as general command headquarters, armored corps headquarters, weapons stores, engineering corps headquarters, strategic bridges and others. They have used residential buildings and civilian objects to shelter, under so-called city warfare tactics. It also focused on neutralizing the Sudanese army capabilities, mainly the air force, heavy artillery and others.

The RSF are fast moving, flexible and highly firepower; they are armed with light vehicles with medium-range machine guns, which give them the advantage of moving between regions at great speed.

RSF’s presence is intensified in Khartoum and in its three cities (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman), owing to the support of its allies in Western Darfur and in some other areas. In addition, the RSF depend on a specific method of mobilization and coexistence, in which RSF’s supporters come to Khartoum, fight with their cousins, then take gold, money and cars and return to their cities and others come and so on.

• The Operational Status of the Sudanese Army:

The Sudanese Army is fighting a battle for which it has not been prepared. Despite its military superiority in terms of (personnel, equipment, and weapons), the battle is not easy. Initially, the Army relied on a defensive method to deal with the first shock of the RSF’s attack, and it achieved a remarkable success. Later, the army shifted his strategy to attack the RSF’s sanctuaries in cities. Sheltering in cities is a major challenge for any regular army, which will have virtually limited options in dealing, given its eagerness to minimize any damage to facilities and infrastructure. In the midst of these challenges, the Sudanese army tried to neutralize as many RSF armed elements as possible, cut off supply lines coming from outside Khartoum, and target the (non-fixed) locations of the RSF using the aerial and artillery weapons. The Sudanese army has taken into consideration many constraints and obstacles, including the fear of large numbers of civilian casualties, and the destruction of residential buildings and infrastructure in the targeted areas in general, mainly because they are the capabilities of the Sudanese State, and that their destruction for the purpose of breaking the other fighting party’s will constitutes a grave loss to the Sudanese people that will be difficult to compensate in the future in light of a difficult economic situation.

The Sudanese army has encircled Khartoum to prevent and cut off supply lines to RSF from other areas. Nevertheless, the task has not been easy, as the cities of Khartoum and Darfur overlap with other cities, and the RSF have so far succeeded in positioning and sheltering in some residential areas.

Therefore, the Sudanese army is trying in every way to prevent land lines of communication between areas where the RSF is stationed in Khartoum and its bases in some areas of Darfur in the west. The army also seeks to contain any attempts of the RSF to destabilize Darfur through provoking tribal conflicts or mobilizing some tribes loyal to Hemedti.

Moreover, the Sudanese army drained the other side through the “needle drilling” strategy, as Al-Burhan said, depending on the length of time and minimizing losses. The longer the war lasted, the more the balance tended to be in the army’s favor, because of its long experience and the increased support of the Sudanese people.

In short, the Sudanese army is betting on resolving the battle in its favor after securing the support of the Sudanese people against the RSF that have been destroyed and looted the capabilities of the State and the Sudanese people. The Sudanese people’s absolute bias towards the army is an important indicator of what is to come. Convoys of Sudanese youth volunteers to serve with the army and to fight the RSF are among those indicators.

Analysis of Al-Burhan’s Foreign Visits:

It seemed clear from the context surrounding the Sudanese crisis that the stalemate had dominated the nature of the military and political situation in general. No single fighting party is capable of winning the war, and it does not seem possible to stop the war through regional initiatives, at a time when the international community remains preoccupied with other, more vital issues. Consequently, the time factor for resolving the Sudanese crisis cannot be overstated, as that means the end of this State and the loss of its capabilities.

It should be borne in mind that civil war is on the horizon, that the Sudan is on the threshold of a new humanitarian catastrophe that the United Nations and working organizations may be unable to afford, and that a people who may have to flee to neighboring states that are also riddled with problems and challenges.

In this dismal context, Al-Burhan’s foreign visits have drawn attention, so in this section we seek to clarify their importance at that time, the messages they have carried, the desired goals and the results they can achieve.

• Egypt:

Al-Burhan chose to visit Cairo to express the Sudanese people’s appreciation for the supporting role played by Egypt at all levels in this difficult ordeal. However, this visit reflected some important signs, including a full welcome for any efforts by the Egyptian leadership to resolve the crisis, including the mechanism of Sudan’s neighboring countries, especially in light of the Sudanese rejection of the non-neutral IGAD platform, as well as the Sudanese fears about the possible outputs of the Jeddah platform.

The Sudanese leadership has had concerns about the outputs of the Jeddah Platform during the meetings, where a political solution based on sharing wealth and power, and adopting security and military measures between the two fighting parties, and restoring solutions that Sudan had previously experienced and had not worked, has presented.

Al-Burhan has also reached some facilities that the Egyptian Government could offer to Sudanese brothers reside there, as well as facilities related to crossing the border between the two countries, such as the issuance of visas. He also discussed the situation of the Sudanese community in their second homeland, Egypt. Egypt Air’s decision to operate flights for eastern Sudan airport was among the gains of Al-Burhan’s visit, given the suspension of flights from Khartoum airports that had been bombed and destroyed by the RSF.

Given the nature of the Al-Burhan’s delegation, other issues have been discussed at the security and intelligence level.

• South Sudan:

With regard to the Sudanese crisis, South Sudan is a neighboring country on the one hand, a country that overlaps demographically and strategically with the Sudan on the other hand, and then an influential state on the Sudanese political scene in recent years on the third hand. In the post-2019, Juba, the capital of South Sudan, played an important role in the peace conventions signed with the armed movements, and made efforts, individually or in cooperation with some neighboring countries, including Cairo, to interact positively with the Sudanese scene, especially in the period after 15^th April 2023 to date.

The main objective of Al-Burhan’s visit to South Sudan was to obtain a political support required at this critical time. However, Al-Burhan wanted to discuss more than one file with President Salva Kiir Mayardit, including South Sudan’s role in IGAD, and Juba’s contribution to the formulation of a rational and balanced discourse in IGAD taking into account the requirements of the Sudanese situation and putting an end to the Organization’s bias towards any parties to the conflict. Al-Burhan also wanted to discuss the control of the common border with South Sudan to prevent the arrival of weapons or personnel supplies for the RSF.

• Qatar:

Doha -Qatar’s capital- was the third stop for Al-Burhan’s visit, within a Sudanese vision for the map of the external movement, in line with the requirements of the current stage, and the Sudanese vision for priorities in general.

Analysts disagreed on the reason of Al-Burhan’s choice of Qatar as a third stop, but four explanations can be provided: First, the visit has been a message for other Gulf States that play unwelcome roles that the Transitional Sovereignty Council has not welcomed; Second, the visit has come within the framework of regional balance management, in other words, Al-Burhan has bet that Qatar has a role to play in supporting his political situation alongside Egypt and South Sudan in exchange for the roles of other countries trying to support a particular faction; Third, Al Burhan has wanted to obtain financial support and secure the financial needs of the Sudanese treasury, which is currently suffering as a result of the war and the cessation of the State activities, along with his desire to benefit from Qatar’s experience in mediation and the management of negotiations with armed groups, in which Doha had previously played and succeeded in the Darfur Peace Agreement. According to the third explanation, Al-Burhan may have wanted to review the Gulf state’s vision of possible solutions to the crisis, and opportunities for negotiations with the RSF to end the war in terms of acceptable political formulas. Fourth, Doha’s choice was the result of its neutral stance on the Sudanese crisis and its parties, with its focus on calls for a cessation of war and bloodshed, and the adoption of the humanitarian path in particular.

Al-Burhan was accompanied by Ali al-Sadiq, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and General Ahmad Ibrahim Mufadal, the head of the general intelligence Services, during his visit to Qatar, which means that the visit has had political and security dimensions.

The main objectives of Sudan’s visit to Qatar are as follows:

• To update Qatar on the current situation in Sudan.
• To thank Qatar for its unconditional humanitarian attitude and support to the Sudanese people.
• To request Qatar’s support in negotiating paths through the Jeddah Platform and the Sudan’s Neighboring Countries Platform.
• To request Qatar’s support at the forthcoming UN General Assembly meeting in New York; this is expected to be attended by Al-Burhan.
• To pave the way for any future mediation that Qatar may undertake, and to promote any future cooperation shared in various files.

The results of the visit included:

• To affirm Qatar’s firm position in supporting efforts to stop the war and maintain the security and stability of Sudan.
• To reject any wrong practices affecting the dignity and safety of the Sudanese people.
• To reaffirm Qatar’s situation on strengthening negotiations and the political path as the appropriate solution to the crisis.
• Eritrea

Al-Burhan chose to visit Eritrea as a neighboring state with borders with Sudan, and can effectively contribute to supporting the political path adopted by Egypt as represented in the Sudan’s neighboring states, on which Al-Burhan appears to greatly depend on to resolve the current impasse in Sudan.

Securing the Sudanese-Eritrean common border was a main issue of Al-Burhan’s visit to Eritrea, in order to prevent the support of the RSF with personnel and weapons from the eastern side. During his visit, Al-Burhan also wanted to ensure the neutral situation of some armed factions in eastern Sudan, where the Eritrean Government could significantly influence. The Sudanese party seeks to prevent such factions from interfering in the current conflict and to warn them against any attempts to exploit Sudan’s current impasse to raise tribal problems in eastern Sudan, or in any way to clash with the Sudanese army (as the Northern Wing People’s Movement has done over the past period).

It was clear that Sudan wanted Asmara to support its recent efforts regarding the delegitimization of the RSF, as well as support for the political path expected to be revitalized in the coming period.

• Turkey:

Turkey was the last and fifth stop for AL-Burhan, after several visits to active and influential countries in the Sudanese scene. Needless to say, Sudan has been an important part of Turkish policy in Africa. During the period of the bailout, Turkey was able to establish a base of economic, political, security and military interests in Sudan. Bilateral relations have seen remarkable activity since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Sudan in December 2017, where the two countries signed 22 agreements and memorandums of understanding in many areas, including education, agriculture, trade, iron and steel industry, exploration, energy exploration, gold extraction development, creation of grain silos, health services and power generation.

In the post-revolutionary phase, Turkey’s interest in Sudan continued to protect its interests there, but it has faced some difficulties as a result of the volatile political situation in Sudan over the past three years. Sudan had witnessed a variety of polarizations and the widening margin of movement for countries hostile to Turkey in the region in general and in Sudan in particular. Therefore, Turkey has tried to adopt a neutral attitude and support the transitional political path in all its steps.

Turkey is a strategic regional actor, and Al-Burhan has chosen to visit, believing that Ankara could play a prominent role in breaking the current Sudanese deadlock. It is believed that Al-Burhan aims, through his visit to Turkey, to:

• To support the political path, namely the mechanism of Sudan’s neighboring states, to be revitalized during the coming period under the auspices of Egypt, or at least contribute to consolidating the negotiating platforms within aforesaid mechanism, so as to facilitate the handling of the crisis.
• To boost the recent steps taken by AL-Burhan regarding the RSF’s delegitimization, considering it as a rebel group that should be militarily confronted until eliminated.
• To ensure Turkey’s support for the humanitarian aspects currently required to be addressed, given that the situation has worsened considerably as the war has prolonged and geographically expanded

Meantime, it was not excluded that military and security cooperation would be discussed during Al-Burhan’s visit, especially given the Sudanese army’s need of drones, which has proven to be effective in such confrontations, particularly in urban wars. Needless to mention, Turkey’s drones have a good reputation in international arms market, after being tested in more than one operational arena.

Probable Determinants:

During the coming period, the overall assessment of the future of Sudan’s crisis will be governed by a number of determinants that could tip the balance in favor of the army or the RSF, most notably:

• Change the map of regional and international backers:

This change is linked to Al-Burhan’s ability to implement his political and military orientations that have been formulated recently, especially since he left Khartoum and resided in eastern Sudan, and also since he made five foreign visits to date. Those political and military orientations include the RSF’s delegitimization and the non-acceptance of any negotiation process that would grant the RSF any presence within the Sudanese army as a single military bloc. For his part, Al-Burhan rejects the idea of integration, which has been raised before the war, but supports the idea of accommodating those who would disarm, granting those advantages such as the same military rank and privileges.

• The Situation of armed groups towards war.

The armed groups in Sudan can play a likely role in favor of either fighting party. Under their capabilities, they can disperse the Sudanese military if they join the RSF side. However, if they join the Sudanese army, their complete neutrality can be guaranteed at least.

• The Situation of political and popular powers in Darfur.

The Situation of political powers in Darfur, as well as civil administrations, can have an influential role in the war, as the RSF in the future bets on shifting the war to Darfur, if they fail in Khartoum, because of Hemedti’s tribal incubator there. However, these powers still support the army.

• The Situation of Sudanese public opinion on the war.

Reports from inside Sudan indicate that Sudanese public mood has become generally anti-war. However, clear changes in the Sudanese people’s attitude towards the army, especially with the increase in crimes committed by the RSF against citizens, including looting, rape and others.

• Egypt’s role through Sudan’s neighboring countries.

The Mechanism of Sudan’s neighboring countries can be succeeded through an effective role of Egypt, in cooperation with some partner countries, as the Mechanism is currently the most acceptable platform compared to the IGAD and Jeddah platforms. To achieve this, a clear roadmap should be adopted that meets the aspirations of Sudan’s parties, according to acceptable consensus formulas.

• Activation of International Sanctions.

The USA has imposed sanctions on the RSF’s leaders; therefore, it can put pressure on Hemedti to end the war, once the sanctions are activated. However, if sanctions are merely ineffective formalities, this means the continuation of the American approach previously announced by the US administration; it is to weaken the two fighting parties, to deal with them without discrimination, not have any role in Sudan’s future, and to hand over power to civilians.

Potential Scenarios:

• Three potential military scenarios on Sudan’s impasse can be posed, as follows:
• The war between the Sudanese army and the RSF continues, according to a zero equation; a firm belief of both fighting parties reinforces the idea that there can be no return to pre-April 15, 2023 status, as General Al-Burhan stated in one of his statements.
• The Sudanese army achieves victories in Khartoum in terms of encircling the capital and blockading the RSF’s elements during the coming period, so they may be forced to exit and withdraw to their tribal bases in Darfur, in view of the growing popular support for the army, where volunteers have joined the army in some states.
• In the medium term, if the Sudanese crisis continues as now, the Sudanese army can prevail as long as the war prolongs and the people’s support increases. Therefore, time is the decisive factor in favor of the army. If the RSF’S influence in Khartoum recedes, they may withdraw and shift the fight to Darfur, where they ensure tribal support, and supply lines from some neighboring countries. Meanwhile, we do not rule out a civil war scenario, if the RSF succeed in shifting the war to Darfur and inflaming pro-Sudanese tribes there against pro-Sudanese army political groups.
• Five political scenarios can be put forward to overcome the Sudanese impasse, as follows:
• Revitalizing the mechanism of Sudan’s neighboring countries; the coming period is expected to see further Egyptian moves to revitalize the relevant mechanism, according to a balanced formula. Meanwhile, Egypt’s movements have strong Arab support, seeking the path of stopping the war, coinciding with the launch of a transitional political process supported regionally and internationally, whose parties include the Sudanese National Army and active civilian forces.
• Rejecting proposals for the integration of the RSF and the consolidation of parallel military groups. This may explain the situation of the Sudanese Army and the Sovereignty Council on the Jeddah and IGAD platforms, which have suggested the same scenario, within a political path based on terms and principles of negotiations closer to the experience of the Naivasha negotiations in 2005.
• Unifying the negotiating platforms under one umbrella, whether IGAD or the African Union, where the idea is expected to be posed in the coming period. However, the Sudanese army’s situation is an obstacle to the unification process, with frequent talk about non-neutral roles for some of IGAD’s states and criticism of the African Union Commission’s Chairperson, who has recently met with a RSF’s leader.
• Withdrawing from IGAD; if differences between Sudan and the IGAD group worsen, Sudan is expected to withdraw from the organization or suspend its membership indefinitely
• Tipping Libya’s scenario; two governments in the country. If the political efforts of the mechanism of Sudan’s neighboring countries do not succeed in reaching a stable political settlement, taking the concerns of most Sudanese political parties and ensuring a political transition from war to peace into consideration, expectations for parallel governments remain. Meanwhile, the RSF may announce as soon as they succeed in maintaining control over some areas, forming a government and self-management for those areas, especially given the persistence of external support channels capable of penetrating borders from some neighboring countries.

To conclude, the overall assessment of the current situation inside Sudan indicates that the country will not soon stabilize, as access to stability needs many concessions that may not be possible right now. The equation of war has become zero, and all options are inappropriate. Accepting negotiation with the RSF means to grant them political, military and regional gains, which will later threaten Sudan’s unity. In addition, the scenario of the continued fighting with the RSF, until they are fully neutralized, is also difficult for previously-addressed considerations, which means that we will face a scenario of an endless long war scenario. Returning to pre-April 15 scenario is no longer perceived or accepted by the Sudanese national army, institutions, and public opinion.

In the face of this grim picture, we wish the brotherly Sudan safety and return to stability, and to overcome this ordeal as soon as possible. We also hope that his people will recover from the war and its scourge and find security throughout their homeland.