South War And Possible Arrangements For The Future Of The Gaza Strip

December 7^th, 2023

Presentation:

1. Israel returned to continue its declared war on the Gaza Strip, launching Operation South in conjunction with its continued completion of Operation North, after the expiration of the humanitarian truce that Egypt, the United States, the State of Qatar and other efforts succeeded in concluding, and it was hoped that it would be extended for a longer period, in order to prepare the political and international atmosphere. To reach a permanent ceasefire, as the Israeli non-compliance on the one hand led to a complete cessation of military operations, and Hamas’ inability on the other hand to adhere to the conditions (10 hostages), which revealed that Hamas does not have sole control over the hostage file and that part of it is held by other Palestinian factions to The end of the truce and not extending it.
2. The third phase of the war begins after the first phase that immediately followed the seventh of October and was called the air force’s preliminary fire phase. It was followed by the second phase, represented by the ground operation in the northern Gaza Strip, which extended until the end of last month and ended with a four-day truce agreement that was extended for some days a little later. Then now, approximately on December 3^rd , the third phase of Israeli military operations began, which included the southern regions for operations alongside the north.
3. The Peace Center presented several previous assessments of the war on Gaza. In this assessment, the Israeli operations in the north and south will be analyzed, with the aim of exploring the various political positions, as well as an attempt to determine the political and military objectives of the post-truce operations, seeking to understand the most important features of the current phase of the war, and to determine What is being prepared for the future of Gaza and the region as a whole.

Evaluation of Israeli military operations after the armistice:

North Gaza Front:

4. The post-truce operations were uglier and more ferocious than the pre-truce period, as the Israeli army continued its operations in the areas of northern Gaza with the return of Major General Al-Julani in order to tighten control over some areas that had eluded them as a result of the fierce resistance from Hamas and Jihad fighters and the rest of the Palestinian factions, which know well that may be are fighting their last battle, to survive or die.
5. The Israeli planning departments seek to compensate for the time off during the days of the truce, by inflicting the greatest possible number of losses among Palestinian civilians, further destruction of buildings and infrastructure, and more siege and pressure. As the Israeli leaders announced, this pressure is the only way to recover the hostages and detainees held by Hamas. The factions are a declared goal, but in reality they are not real. Israel decided to sacrifice these hostages in order to implement its strategic goals, which it became clear to it could only be achieved in circumstances like these, taking advantage of unlimited Western and American support for it.
6. The resistance factions in the north are still able to deprive the Israeli forces of achieving full control over all the neighborhoods and regions of northern Gaza, as operations are still ongoing fiercely in the Shujaiya neighborhood, the Jenin camp, the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, and others. This is evidenced by the preparation of thought and ranks of the Israeli army, which have exceeded eighty since the start of operations, in addition to the daily damage and destruction of a number of Israeli mechanisms, vehicles and tanks.

South Gaza Front:

7. The Israeli army announced the opening of a new front in the southern Gaza Strip, in Khan Yunis Governorate specifically, in what it calls a “ground maneuver.” The Israeli Army Chief of Staff spoke of it as representing the third phase of the war on the Gaza Strip, in which violent and intense aerial bombardment was used, what is known as the fire belts, and the removal of population squares in preparation for the entry of the armored forces into those areas.
8. Israel’s choice to open this front is due to several considerations and reasons, including:
9. Khan Yunis is considered the second largest city in the Strip after Gaza City in terms of population and area.
10. Khan Yunis is the birthplace of both the head of the Hamas political bureau in Gaza, Yahya Al-Sinwar, and Khaled Al-Deif, the commander-in-chief of the Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
11. The Israeli claim is that the leaders of the Hamas movement have fled to the areas south of the Gaza Valley, and that the Hamas leadership and the movement’s military wing are running the battle from those areas.
12. Claiming to search for prisoners, hostages and missing persons in the southern Gaza Strip.
13. Destroying what could be destroyed in Khan Yunis and killing and displacing thousands in retaliation against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, and those areas contained festive scenes on the seventh of October, whether by killing soldiers or capturing them, and taking possession of their property and military jeeps.
14. The Israeli army realizes that its battle in Khan Yunis will not be easy, and may even be fiercer than the fighting in the North Gaza Governorate, given the record of confrontation between the army and the Khan Yunis Brigade, the Al-Qassam Brigades, in 2014. The Israeli army lost 40% of its human and military strength in the Governorate Khan Yunis, according to military analyst Waseb Erekat. Al-Qassam Brigades fighters have gained combat experience to confront the Israeli army, and this is what the army also observed in the confrontation with the resistance in the Shuja’iya neighborhood in the current ground maneuver.

Features of the third phase in the Israeli occupation plan in the Gaza Strip

10. The Israeli army’s plan is based on dividing the central and southern Gaza Strip, where the first section is: Deir al-Balah and the Nuseirat, al-Bureij, and al-Maghazi camps, and the third is the border city of Rafah with Egypt. If the plan succeeds, the Israeli army will divide the Gaza Strip into 4 operational areas, each with dedicated forces and another defense, in order to achieve a set of political, military and strategic goals.

Military objectives

11. The Israeli army, in general, aims to restore its image and prestige, which was broken on October 7^th , 2023. Unlike previous Israeli wars, which were aimed at restoring the image of politicians and government leaders in Israel, the army is the one who seeks to continue the military operation and not stop it in the Gaza Strip; mostly it has a retaliatory nature against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
12. On the other hand, the Palestinian resistance factions are fighting valiantly in the Gaza Governorate and North Gaza in the face of the huge and powerful military machine at the same time, and the tight siege, despite the passage of more than sixty days of war and the massive destruction that parallels the destruction of important European cities in During the Second World War, the resistance is still capable of steadfastness, challenge and confrontation. The Israeli army announced that the resistance in Gaza had lost control and control over Gaza and the north, but it was demonstrated on the ground that it still exists and is capable of managing the battle with the occupation, as happened in handing over the hostages from the crossing Carney.

Political objectives

13. Netanyahu’s last chance
14. The war of extermination against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is a personal war for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, given that he is the supreme rapporteur on foreign affairs and Israel’s security. He tried to evade responsibility for the security failure to prevent the attacks of October 7^th, 2023, but he was met with a strong response from the army and security services. .
15. Netanyahu aims to survive politically and maintain his political standing and the government. There is no doubt that his political future is currently at stake in light of the apparent divisions between him and his Defense Minister Gallant.
16. The Israeli press is circulating talk about an alliance forming on the horizon between Benny Gantz and Gallant to overthrow Netanyahu after the war stops.
17. Netanyahu is currently prepared to reduce the ceiling of his goals related to the objectives of the war and the conduct of its operations, whether by eliminating the Hamas movement, to weaken it, or to liberate Israeli prisoners and hostages, for the sake of his political future. Rather, it is in Netanyahu’s political interest to extend the period of war, and maintain the state of emergency in Israel from In order to remain in the prime minister’s chair, he may have a lifeline from the three corruption files that are pursuing him (Netanyahu’s lawyer announced on December 5^th that his client will not be able to attend the trial sessions due to war conditions). As the war continues, Benjamin Netanyahu’s testimony in his trial in the corruption files will be delayed. It is possible that under the permanent state of emergency, Israeli President Isaac Herzog will grant a pardon, or the Knesset will expedite a law to grant a pardon to Netanyahu.
18. Netanyahu is fully aware that his government’s failure to quickly recover the prisoners and hostages will hasten the fall of his government, and Hamas is also well aware of this.
19. The Likud Party’s desire to prolong the war. To achieve any victory, he will avoid a devastating loss that may haunt him for years to come in the Israeli political sphere. It is clear from the three goals that Israel set for the war that it wants to open the time frame for the war to months and perhaps a year, which is met with American reservations, as Biden and his administration advised the Israeli leaders to quickly complete the operation within a few weeks. In this regard, we point out that the October 7 attacks led to a decline in the popularity of the Likud leader to below 29% in opinion polls, and the erosion of the electoral power of the Likud Party, while the popularity of the head of the National Camp, Benny Gantz, continued to grow, and the electoral power of the opposition parties that granted him increased opinion polls on the formation of the next government if early elections are held for the Knesset. The specific and narrow political goals of the Likud Party and Netanyahu personally may have clear repercussions on the future of this war, either by prolonging it unnecessarily and without convincing reasons. Or the Israeli government will be forced to stop this war without being able to achieve the goals set for it, if internal pressures on it worsen and are accompanied by strong American pressures.

The post-war Israeli vision:

15. Buffer zones. One of Israel’s most important strategic goals in the war on the Gaza Strip is to maximize the Strip’s losses, and most of what it can lose is geography (land) and demographics (population), by making the Strip unfit for life and deteriorating it to the point that contributes to the loss of land and population. To allow the settlers to return to the so-called envelop, and to lead a normal life there, the Strip must lose its area by establishing a buffer zone between 2-3 kilometers inside the Strip in the northern and eastern areas of the Gaza Strip, which requires the destruction of any building in it, or any Property or agricultural lands of Palestinian citizens, and threatening anyone who approaches them.
16. Voluntary or forced displacement. The third phase of operations helps to strengthen one of Israel’s most important strategic goals in this war, which is to forcefully displace the population of the Gaza Strip, whether voluntarily or forcibly, according to a set of indicators, including that the plan contained three phases, the first of which included intensive air strikes and the division of the Strip into the northern Gaza Valley. And south of it, entire residential neighborhoods were destroyed in the Gaza and North Gaza governorates, completely demolishing residential blocks, killing hundreds of Palestinians, and even displaced people in hospitals and UNRWA schools, bombing market centers, destroying bakeries and water wells, putting pressure on the population, and not providing aid to the residents of Gaza in order to go to The south, calling on residents directly and indirectly to be displaced through leaflets, social media networks, and infiltrating local radio broadcasts, under the pretext that Gaza and its north are combat zones. A map of the Gaza Strip was published on which population blocs were identified, specifying the places of displacement and where the residents were heading. The same thing was repeated during the preparation for the ground maneuver in the southern Gaza Strip. Residents of the city of Khan Yunis were asked to migrate to the city of Rafah, using fire belts on the outskirts of villages, cities and towns in Khan Yunis Governorate, which constitutes about a quarter of the governorate’s population. UNRWA estimates that the number of displaced people will be About 600 thousand displaced people, bringing the total number of displaced people to about 1.9 million, the majority of whom are concentrated in the border city of Rafah. This coincided with the US Congress’s efforts to prepare a plan that would include linking the reception of displaced people from the Gaza Strip to Arab countries.
17. Evacuate Gaza of weapons. This was made clear in Netanyahu’s statements on December 6 that one of the objectives of the operation is to reach a demilitarized zone and that this will be achieved through Israeli forces only and not through any international or UN efforts. In addition to that, it was revealed that Benjamin Netanyahu is coordinating with the United States in that he seeks to ensure security control over the Gaza Strip, by controlling the Philadelphia axis, that is, the southern regions of the Strip.
18. The general idea of the Israeli goals is to open the time frame for the military operation to the longest possible period, knowing that the complete elimination of Hamas and the resistance factions in Gaza, the disarmament operations and the requirements for establishing buffer zones in the Gaza Strip require major political, security and military arrangements and at the same time require time to implement and stabilize them.

Political Variables

19. There is no doubt that the current political contexts surrounding the third phase of Israeli military operations in Gaza – which appears to focus its main military effort in the southern regions – include several important variables that we summarize as follows:
20. Gradual erosion of the political position inside Israel. This is evident from the internal pressure in Israel, especially from public opinion, the families of the detainees, and the families of the dead Israeli soldiers, of whom numbers are killed every day, and whose bodies are spread in an atmosphere of clear grief and grief from their families and covered by the media. It was even remarkable that Haaretz newspaper allowed the mother of one of the dead soldiers to write: An emotional, touching article on one of her pages about her son who was killed in the war, and she sent a message to Netanyahu that this war has no clear goals and will not bring security. This pressure may increase if the Israeli opposition, especially Lapid and others, begins to raise their voice loudly against the war, if the truth about Netanyahu’s personal goals for prolonging it is made clear to them.
21. Features of disagreements within the Israeli War Council. Signs of disagreement emerged within the War Council, especially between Netanyahu and Gallant. One of the indicators of this was Gallant’s failure to attend the Prime Minister’s daily press conference, as has been the norm since the start of the war, and Gallant was also absent from the first meeting of the Likud Party since the seventh of last October, as some of Netanyahu’s statements indicated. The disagreement occurred when he said in response to a journalist, “Only listen to politicians.”
22. Increasing American pressure. Which contributed to the widening of the area of difference between the United States and Israel, especially since the launch of Operation South, the most prominent of which are the following:

(1) The United States had some limited reservations about the operation and demanded, for example, the establishment of safe zones.

(2) Strong American political positions also emerged that supported the Egyptian and Jordanian positions by refusing to displace the Palestinians from their areas. There is no doubt that this refusal, and if the Biden administration is serious about its firm commitment to it, will deprive Israel of the greatest prize it dreams of, which is getting rid of the burden of the Gaza Strip and rearranging it. Politically, security-wise, and geostrategically, according to its own vision of national security.

(3) The US administration issued restrictions on granting visas to Israelis involved in violence in the West Bank, in a direct reference targeting extremist settlers affiliated with the Ben Gvir and Somtrich movement.

(4) Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s confirmation that the United States will support measures to hold accountable those involved in the violence in the Gaza Strip, regardless of the victim or the perpetrator of the crime, in an indirect reference to the settlers.

1. A clear change in the European position. The expansion of popular rejectionist positions, especially in Europe and other influential countries, will force its government to amend its political positions on this war, and attempt to put political pressure on Israel to stop the war, or at least restrict its freedom of movement, which was granted to it during the first weeks of the war in an unprecedented manner. Which contributed to exposing the moral position of some European governments, which were and are still paying lip service to the concepts of human rights, international law, and other slogans that were made clear to be waived in the event that Israel or its allied countries were a party to the equation, and the issuance of strong political positions from countries such as Poland, France, and Spain demanding To stop the war and demand that Israel respect international law and protect civilians.
2. Crisis between Israel and the United Nations. In light of the widening area of disagreement between Israel on the one hand and the United Nations on the other, as well as with the representative of the European Union’s foreign policy, they agreed that the current war would undermine the United Nations system and its institutions and likened the extent of the destruction in Gaza to what happened in World War II, while denouncing the killing of employees. Nations and not providing them with protection, in addition to Israel’s demand that some UN bodies operating in northern Gaza vacate their headquarters and declare that it will not grant work visas to some UN bodies in some areas of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Prime Minister’s statement that the current mandate of the Secretary-General threatens the United Nations and its role. For the first time in decades, the Secretary-General of the United Nations activated Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, which gives the Secretary-General the right to alert the Security Council of any issue that threatens international peace and security and call it to convene for that purpose.
3. The dispute between Israel and Turkey escalated. Especially after Turkey began some time ago to raise the ceiling of its political rhetoric against Israel by focusing directly on the person of Netanyahu, as Erdogan stated more than once that Turkey cannot deal with Netanyahu, but rather he must be held accountable as a war criminal in international courts.
4. Increasing pressures on Jordanian-Israeli relations. It became clear that Jordan began to take gradual escalatory steps against Israel, starting with the diplomatic procedure of withdrawing the ambassador and asking the Israeli ambassador to leave Amman, followed by freezing the water-for-energy agreement. Some expect that popular pressure on the Jordanian leadership will continue and it will be forced to suspend its commitment to the peace treaty with Israel.
5. Egyptian dissatisfaction with Israel’s continuation of the war and obstruction of truce and ceasefire efforts, and its continued obstruction of humanitarian efforts in the Gaza Strip, which Egypt is leading through its control of the Rafah crossing, in addition to the clear Egyptian objection to Israel’s continued killing of civilians and the destruction of the Strip and what this could lead to. Of the possibilities of pushing the Palestinians towards the Egyptian border, it seems that Egypt discussed these matters with the American side and delivered strong messages in this regard, which prompted a number of American officials to confirm their rejection of displacement. Some press reports also indicated that the Egyptian side clearly informed Israel that it may be forced to take escalation steps at the political level if it is confirmed that Israel will continue its deliberate efforts to push the Palestinians to the border with Egypt.
6. Arab-Gulf movement in the Security Council. The Arab group within the Security Council resumed its efforts to issue a second Security Council resolution to stop the war for humanitarian reasons, and this time it became clear that the Gulf Arab group was keen to include ambassadors and representatives from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to form an international front in support of the resolution, and to attempt to meet with a number of American officials in New York and Washington. . Despite the seriousness of these political moves, especially by some of the active Gulf states, there are pressure cards up their sleeve that have not yet been used, and they can at least be waved around, especially with regard to the file of normalization and the file of Saudi-Israeli relations. There is no doubt that these are influential papers, especially on the American side (the real sponsor of the recent normalization path and plans).

Military and security variables:

21. Threat to maritime security in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea. This is explained as follows:
22. The Houthis targeted some ships, one British and the other Israeli, and announced that the American destroyer “Carney” stationed in the southern Red Sea had responded to drones and missiles that were targeting maritime navigation.
23. Israel announced that it was carrying out an attack on some drones and missiles coming from the direction of the southern Red Sea and shooting them down.
24. The United States and Britain announced that they are discussing with countries in the region the formation of joint forces to protect navigation in the Red Sea and conduct maritime surveillance missions.
25. Israel announced the signing of an agreement with the UAE to operate a land bridge from the port of Jebel Ali to the port of Haifa in order to avoid Israeli ships crossing the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
26. Assassination operations are expected outside the borders. Turkish intelligence warned its Israeli counterparts against carrying out assassinations of Palestinian figures on its territory. This came in response to the statement of the head of the Israeli Shin Bet on December 3 that he would pursue Hamas leaders in Qatar and Turkey, and not just in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and wherever they are.
27. Possibility of the situation getting out of control between Iran, Israel and the West. Although Iran is still committed to adopting a strategy of cautious approach to the course of the war and has been keen, until now, not to get involved in the war yet, as some initially bet because of its ideological commitment to the resistance, the current period is witnessing some events that may push things out of this equation. Among them are the following:
28. Iranian harassment of American naval vessels in the Arabian Gulf, and one of its marches monitoring and tracking the movement of naval vessels accompanying the aircraft carrier Dwight Eisenhower.
29. US National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan’s statement that Iran is responsible for targeting ships in the Red Sea because it provided the Houthis with missile capabilities.
30. Targeting the Ain al-Assad and Hawar bases in northern Iraq, where American advisory teams from an Iraqi armed group affiliated with Iran are stationed.
31. The Israeli Defense Minister announced that he will work to push Hezbollah away from the Israeli border to the other side of the Litani River, if international efforts fail in this regard, which is clear that there is international pressure currently being exerted on the Lebanese government in accordance with Resolution 1701 issued by the Security Council, which will mean in a way Hezbollah’s direct entry into the war and its abandonment of its currently limited rules of engagement with the Israeli army.

Final evaluation:

24. It is clear from the total information discussed in this assessment and the accompanying analysis of some points that the current situation in Gaza will remain volatile in the near term, and is even likely to deteriorate further, whether on the humanitarian level or on the political, military, and security levels, and in this context It is important to note a number of relevant sub-evaluations, the most important of which are the following:
25. Despite what has been reported about disagreements within the Israeli War Council between Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, as well as what has been made clear of pressure, whether from the opposition led by Lapid or from the Israeli street and the families of the detained and killed soldiers, the position inside Israel is still apparently coherent and will remain so until the end of the war, but we will be turned upside down. After the war stopped, therefore, we should not rely on the position and statements of the current government, but rather we must prepare to deal with the upcoming changes in Israel.
26. The American-Israeli differences remain unaffected on the course of the war, as President Biden and members of his administration are still committed to supporting Israel’s right to defend itself and are still adopting the various Israeli narratives, whether with regard to the safe zones or the accusations directed against Hamas of sexual violence, as well as with regard to holding Hamas responsible for the collapse of the truce. The latter, in addition to Washington continuing to provide military support and various weapons systems to Israel at the same pace, as shipment No. (200) arrived on December 5th within the air bridge that was established since October 8th, and the United States is still contributing strongly to the intelligence effort in It relates to determining the locations of the hostages, in addition to its participation in the political effort through prisoner and detainee negotiations and confronting any Arab or international pressure on Israel, directly or indirectly, in addition to its contribution to the military effort by securing Israel’s maritime space from the Red Sea side as well as from several other directions to achieve Deterrence policy and preventing Iran or any parties from providing assistance to Hamas or expanding the scope of the war and distracting the Israeli war effort. We note that some of the American policy regarding aid or directing criticism from time to time to Israel and its demand to protect civilians or even the decisions regarding the settlers and the violence they practice in the West Bank all come as decisions and policies targeting the American interior primarily to reduce the intensity of the voices calling for pressure on Israel as well as to present a positive image about the American role in the war, especially in front of the governments and peoples of the Arab and Islamic world.
27. The escalating demonstrations in Europe will play a role during the coming period in changing the language of European political discourse towards the war, with the governments of some European countries, especially Britain, Germany and Italy, continuing to play an intelligence and military role alongside Israel (Britain’s announcement to conduct air sorties in the eastern Mediterranean and in the airspace to Gaza and Israel to assist in efforts to locate the hostages).
28. Despite the sharpness of the Turkish and Iranian rhetoric towards Israel, the two countries will continue to maintain their previous positions on the war, while addressing them mainly internally, given the popular discontent that the crimes of the Israeli aggression on Gaza arouse in Tehran and Ankara.
29. The Egyptian and Jordanian positions on the war on Gaza remain at the same level of previous dealing with the events, in which the Egyptian and Jordanian leaderships are keen to condemn Israeli behavior, especially against civilians, and deliberately obstructing humanitarian efforts, as well as obstructing truce and ceasefire efforts, in addition to the basic issue, which is confronting the displacement scenario with all force. The communication channel with the Americans provides an opportunity to reduce any possibilities of collision. However, the chances of collision remain, especially with Egypt, if there are attempts to push the Palestinians to the Egyptian border and storm the Rafah crossing or penetrate the border fence.
30. The Jordanian position is mainly calculated in response to the internal pressure that is strong to take strong positions, but the Jordanian government’s steps appear to be carefully calculated, as there is no desire to reach a point of no return with Israel, especially since the scenario of displacing the residents of the West Bank is currently postponed and depends on the results of the Gaza war.

The future of the situation in Gaza and the region in the foreseeable future:

25. Some ideas were put forward that discuss the future of Gaza after the war, but these ideas do not concern Gaza alone, but rather they concern the Palestinian issue as a whole, but rather they concern the active countries of the region, led by Egypt and Jordan. Some of these arrangements could also have effects on other countries, especially those that It has recently been linked to the process of normalization with Israel. In this context, we point out some of these ideas, some of which may be at the tactical level, and then they may be at the strategic level, and we summarize them as follows:

First: The tactical level in the near term:

1. The Israeli dealing with the issue of prisoners and hostages and efforts to return to the truce. Egyptian-Qatari-American efforts are now cooperating and activating in order to reach another humanitarian truce, including women, children and soldiers. It is in the Israeli government’s interest to accept it, but it wants this to happen without strong concessions on its part regarding the issue of prisoners in Israeli prisons. Therefore, it is putting pressure on Hamas and the factions through military operations and tightening the noose around them. These efforts are expected to reach tangible results before the next Christmas at the end of this month. We must point out clearly that the current Israeli government deals differently with the prisoner file, unlike all previous Israeli governments, as its real interest in the issue of liberating prisoners has declined, regardless of any price in exchange for that. Let us remember the merits of the deal for soldier Gilad Shalit, who was released in a deal in exchange for more than One thousand Palestinian prisoners. It has also been clear since the beginning of this war that the current government changed well-known Israeli approaches to this file, the most important of which was providing lists of the names of prisoners and their pictures to the media.
2. A new resolution is expected from the Security Council. The Arab movements in the Security Council are supported by the Islamic group to issue a binding resolution from the Security Council to stop the war for humanitarian reasons. Although the United States is unlikely to support this resolution, the United States may support a resolution that stipulates a second humanitarian truce.

Second: The strategic level in the medium and long term:

1. The displacement file and Israeli attempts to avoid a clash with Egypt. Israeli Army Radio revealed that there is an ongoing discussion with the Egyptian side, as the Israeli coordinator, Ghassan Alyan, visited Cairo a few days ago, and before that, delegations from some Israeli intelligence services to conduct discussions, whether regarding the issue of aid or regarding truce efforts, as well as regarding issues that could cause a conflict. Relations between the two sides are strained, most notably the issue of displacement. Israel knows Egypt’s categorical position on this issue. However, it continues with sieges, starvation and bombing operations that ultimately lead to the same fate (pushing the Palestinians into Sinai or accumulating them on the Egyptian border with the Gaza Strip in camps and refugee camps that may stabilize in the Palestinian Rafah region for years to come. Until now, this file remains a very important point in which Israel has not been able to achieve any breakthrough, especially after the American position in support of the Egyptian position, and it is actually feared that it will be the straw that broke the camel’s back and cause Egyptian-Israeli relations to return to previous periods of time. Decades ago, the regional peace as a whole was strained.
2. Maritime security file in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Western American moves to establish a maritime surveillance mission in the Red Sea, similar to the Naval Surveillance Force Cental, which is stationed in Bahrain, as well as the activation of the Joint Task Force 150 and 152, in which Israel shares with a number of Gulf states and Egypt, and its field of work extends from the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea all the way to the Red Sea. Likewise, the Pentagon announced that it will work to increase the size of its military presence in the Red Sea during the coming period
3. Palestinian Authority Revitalization Project. It is clear that arrangements are actually being made to help the Palestinian Authority control and rule the Gaza Strip after eliminating Hamas and the rest of the factions (if this is actually achieved), as the British Defense Minister announced on the eighth of December that they are working to help the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza, as he met on the seventh. From December, the US Vice President’s National Security Advisor to the President of the Palestinian Authority was in Ramallah, carrying with him a project called revitalizing the Palestinian Authority, guaranteed to strengthen the authority politically and security-wise to enable it to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as US Vice President Camilla Harris revealed while attending the “COP28” climate summit in the Emirates. Regarding efforts being made with the participation of moderate Arab countries to formulate a political solution for the post-Hamas era, which may be based primarily on a role for the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, with the need for it to first undergo structural reforms that may include changing the current leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and replacing a new leadership that will be more cooperative with Israel, In addition to discussions related to the reconstruction of Gaza and the extent of Arab/Gulf contributions in this regard.
4. Proposals for voluntary displacement to Arab and non-Arab countries. Other Israeli plans were presented through its European allies to establish floating civilian hospitals for the wounded to transport them to Nicosia in Cyprus or any other place agreed upon, and it may be one of the methods of voluntary displacement of some countries in the region. Some proposals are also being circulated about trying to convince some countries in the region voluntary reception of some residents of the Gaza Strip.

Conclusion

26. We are certain every day that the current Gaza war will be a milestone not only in Palestinian history, but it will also have repercussions on the Israeli interior in more than one direction. But the most important thing is that this war will significantly rearrange the shape of the region, and that the arrangements being prepared in the closed chambers which may leave its effects for years and for the coming decades .
27. It is feared that attempts to help the Palestinian Authority govern the Gaza Strip will lead to deepening the Palestinian-Palestinian dispute even more than it already exists. If Hamas and the other factions remain any small pockets or cells, it is not unlikely that we will witness in the next stage and after the war stops (according to the Israeli and American perspective and plan). and the British) Palestinian-Palestinian fighting, as Hamas will continue to believe that it has legitimacy to rule since it was the one who fought the war and paid the price…etc., and that the Palestinian Authority exploited the war to expand its political role on the territory of the Gaza Strip and exercise authority without this being done with Palestinian-Palestinian consensus. We should not forget that Hamas has political leadership abroad and is supported by some countries, and it will resist this issue as well.
28. The Egyptian leadership is facing a sensitive and dangerous stage in the history of the Palestinian and Israeli file, and it indeed requires vigilance, awareness, and action according to a proactive strategy, weighing all accounts with a golden balance. Egypt bears a historical responsibility for this file, in addition to it being among the components of Egyptian national security.